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The aim of this article is to explore the motivations of street-level bureaucrats when 
implementing change initiated by elected politicians. We analyse experimental data on more 
than 1,800 local civil servants from all 243 local governments in South Korea and find that 
street-level bureaucrats are more likely to implement change instigated by local elected 
politicians when their own policy positions are reflected in the reforms. Moreover, the degree 
to which street-level bureaucrats are likely to execute reforms instigated by local politicians is 
greater when bureaucrats perceive themselves as having more freedom to exercise discretion. 
These findings reveal a behavioural insight into the conditions in which bureaucrats are more 
likely to respond to change championed by elected politicians versus conditions where they are 
more likely to follow existing rules in the policy implementation process. 
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Bureaucratic organisations are often expected to run according to rules (Crozier, 1964; 
Weber, 1974). Political science research has offered optimistic views regarding political 
control of the bureaucracy by focusing on how to control bureaucrats rather than on whether 
to control them. An extensive literature on political control of the bureaucracy discusses 
mechanisms of delegation and accountability from inside and outside the bureaucracy and 
highlights the role of principals rather than that of agents (e.g., McCubbins and Schwartz, 
1984; Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999; Huber and Shipan, 2002; Lee, 2020). However, what 
actually happens on the agent side of the principal-agent relationship, particularly on the 
frontline, seems to deviate from the political control arguments.  
 In reality, public employees on the frontline are in a position where they intrinsically 
exert discretion in policy implementation. Lipsky’s (1980/2010) seminal work suggests that 
the discretion granted to street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) and their relative autonomy from 
principals create room to be filled by their own decisions which, in turn, are influenced by 
street-level factors. Although elected politicians do play a role in changing agency policies 
and influencing policy outcomes (Scholz and Wood, 1998; Lewis, 2008; Lee and Park, 
2020), public administrative research has provided limited evidence of political influences on 
the actions of SLBs (Brehm and Gates, 1997; Riccucci et al, 2004; Riccucci, 2005). In a 
word, since Lipsky’s observation of SLBs’ behaviour, this view has been well accepted by 
subsequent research.  
 The main question is, then, what impacts SLBs’ decisions? An extensive literature on 
SLBs’ implementation of policy has examined a variety of factors, ranging from bureaucrats’ 
attitudes and knowledge concerning their tasks (Sandfort, 2000; Meyers and Vorsanger, 
2003), the characteristics of the implementing organisations (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill, 2000; 
Hill and Lynn, 2004; Brodkin, 2007, 2011), to contextual factors related to workloads and 
external pressures (May and Winter, 2009). Regarding political factors, although their 
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influence over SLBs’ implementation is found to be relatively muted, it is still important to 
understand why there is variation in the extent to which SLBs respond to their elected 
politicians across individuals in a given institutional context. Recent research particularly 
illuminates the centrality of bureaucratic discretion in actual implementation of policy change 
(e.g., Tummers and Bekkers, 2014; Miller and Whitford, 2016; Thomann et al, 2018). 
Extending the research, we investigate conditions where SLBs are more responsive to elected 
politicians’ policy change versus those where they are more likely to abide by existing rules 
in local governments’ policy implementation.  
 Building on the theories of SLBs’ implementation and the relationship between 
elected politicians and SLBs, we examine how the congruence of political ideology between 
governors/mayors and SLBs and the degree of discretion SLBs perceive affect the 
implementation of these politicians’ new policy or policy change.1 To test our hypotheses 
proposed below, we employ a unique survey design of a list experiment which leverages 
indirect questioning techniques and integrate a field experimental aspect by conducting the 
surveys at SLBs’ workplaces.  
 Analysing original data on more than 1,800 local civil servants from all 243 
provincial and municipal governments in South Korea, gathered as part of a representative 
survey, we find that SLBs’ policy positions and their perception of discretion indeed 
significantly affect their implementation decisions. SLBs are more likely to implement their 
elected politicians’ policy change when the latter’s political ideology is more congruent with 
their own than when it is incongruent, controlling for several characteristics of 
governors/mayors and bureaucrats. Furthermore, the treatment effects – the degree to which 
 
1 We use political ideology, policy positions, policy views, and policy dispositions interchangeably as they are 
conceptually close to each other. 
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SLBs intend to execute the elected politicians’ policy change – are greater when SLBs 
perceive higher levels of discretion in policy implementation.  
 South Korea is a useful case to test whether local bureaucrats will abide by existing 
rules made by the central government or choose to use their discretion in applying elected 
local politicians’ policy change, given the central government’s control over local 
governments but with room for local bureaucrats’ discretion on the frontline. Since 1995, 
provincial governors and municipal mayors have been directly elected as local agency heads 
every four years. The adoption of local executive elections meant the beginning of 
establishing a local self-government system. However, while provincial governors and 
municipal mayors are granted the authority to enact rules and ordinances, such power is 
limited because the scope of rules and ordinances made by them cannot take precedence over 
the laws and implementation ordinances made by the central government. Moreover, local 
governments are legally and financially dependent on the central government, as the main 
portion of policy responsibility and resources still belongs to the national government.  
 Our research makes clear contributions to the current state of the art of behavioural 
public policy and administration (see Ewert et al, Forthcoming). We provide a behavioural 
insight through experimental evidence of conditions where SLBs are more likely to respond 
to elected politicians’ policy change versus abide by existing rules in implementation 
decisions. While behavioural science has been discussed extensively in association with 
individuals, much less attention has been paid to the discipline as “a tool to improve the way 
government itself functions” (Sanders et al, 2018, 157-8; Lodge and Wegrich, 2016), that is, 
as a tool to better understand public sector behaviour. To fill this gap in the literature, we 
show that the behaviour of SLBs is shaped by and changes with street-level factors, such as 




Street-Level Bureaucrats’ Implementation of Policy Change  
One of the dominant arguments in political science research concerns politicians’ control of 
policy implementation. This view, mainly developed in the context of American politics and 
public policy, discusses which political institutions are more effective in controlling 
bureaucratic agencies which are delegated to execute the politicians’ policy change. Yet, this 
discussion all comes from the perspective of politicians, and whether bureaucratic agencies 
actually perform in a way that leads to the outcome that politicians want, is not certain. This 
so-called “top-down” approach has two major drawbacks in understanding precisely how 
policy change will be implemented by SLBs. First, the top-down approach assumes that 
political instruments should be effective to control the bureaucracy. The literature relevant to 
this top-down approach discusses bureaucrats’ responsiveness to political control 
mechanisms through rewards or punishments, as noted above. However, the other body of 
bureaucrat-centred approaches, the so-called “bottom-up” perspective, raises questions about 
the former approach and suggests that bureaucrats are not always responsive to political 
influence, and that street-level factors should play a more important role in their actions 
(Brehm and Gates, 1997; Riccucci et al, 2004; Riccucci, 2005; Meier and O’Toole, 2006). In 
particular, recent work on SLBs highlights the ambiguous nature of policy decisions and goes 
beyond the simple dichotomy of compliance versus noncompliance with policy directives 
(Brodkin, 2012; Gofen, 2014). 
 Second, executing policy change inherently includes a certain level of bureaucratic 
discretion (Smith, 1965; Lipsky, 1980/2010; Brodkin, 2012), but top-down perspectives of 
policy implementation often take a sceptical or a negative view of bureaucratic discretion 
(Polsky, 1993). To them, bureaucrats’ discretion is mainly seen as a deviation from 
politicians’ ideal policy preferences and thus as hindering conformance implementation. 
However, the truth is that some degree of bureaucrats’ discretion is inevitable for successful 
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implementation, as pointed out by bottom-up approaches, because the workers should be 
allowed room for autonomy in order to be able to manage the frontline circumstances and the 
limited resources available for implementation (Skolnick, 2011; Manning and Van Maanen, 
1978; Maynard-Moody and Portillo, 2010; Tummers and Bekkers, 2014). In sum, an account 
of implementation of policy change without a clear understanding of the role of street-level 
factors in the politician-bureaucrat relationship remains conceptually incomplete.  
 Various studies have examined political and managerial controls over SLBs and their 
ability to affect the actual actions of SLBs (Brehm and Gates, 1997; Keiser and Soss, 1998; 
Brewer, 2005; Riccucci, 2005; May and Winter, 2009). These studies often find that the 
translation of the intentions of politicians and managers into service delivery on the frontline 
is affected by numerous disjunctive factors. Yet, what may add value to this literature is, 
reiterating May and Winter (2009), understanding of how important political or managerial 
influence is in the implementation equation (454) and “the behaviours of street-level 
bureaucrats or the channels through which that influence occurs” (456). As an increasing 
amount of research focusing on SLBs’ behaviour suggests (Gofen, 2014; Boer et al, 2018), 
more in-depth research on SLBs from behavioural perspectives should add value to the 
current knowledge of SLBs’ policy implementation.   
 In this article, we therefore seek to contribute a behavioural insight through 
experimental evidence of conditions where SLBs are more likely to respond to elected 
politicians’ policy change versus abide by existing rules in implementation. Specifically, we 
examine the following two factors concerning bureaucrats’ policy dispositions and 
perceptions that may determine the implementation of their elected politicians’ policy 
change: 1) whether elected politicians’ policy positions are shared by bureaucrats, and 2) the 
level of discretion bureaucrats perceive in policy implementation. In developing our 
hypotheses, our study builds on the assumption of the Weberian model of bureaucracy 
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(Weber, 1958), where civil servants have some knowledge and skill enabling them to 
understand and execute policy change or a new policy (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000, 
2003; Hupe and Hill, 2007). Merit-based bureaucracies are not always the standard 
everywhere in the world, but this proviso does not undermine our logic, evolved as it is based 
on the modernised bureaucratic organisations we frequently observe, including American 
bureaucracy or the Korean case explored in this article. 
  
Ideological Congruence and Implementation of Policy Change 
The political ideology of SLBs is important, because it is conceptually identical to their 
policy dispositions. Since SLBs’ political ideology affects how they will interpret information 
in implementing policies, particularly in organisations with various or vague missions 
(Wilson, 1989/2019), it should influence making implementation on the frontline (Keiser, 
2010). Moreover, policy implementation is “part of the process between initial statement of 
policy and ultimate impact in the world” (O’Toole, 1986, 183), and policy change that is not 
consistent with SLB’s policy dispositions may not be well-performed (Lipsky, 1980/2010; 
O’Toole, 1986; Sabatier, 1986; Huber and Shipan, 2002). Although elected politicians might 
prefer to receive support from agents regardless of their ideology and characteristics (Lee and 
Park, Forthcoming), there is evidence that SLBs’ policy positions generally play a role in 
interpreting and applying elected politicians’ policy programs (Keiser, 1999). 
 Public administration and political science research commonly provides insights into 
how the behaviour of SLBs may be shaped by their political ideology. Keiser (2010, 249-50) 
suggests that bureaucrats’ ideological identification, defined as “the perceptions of 
individuals of where they lie on a liberal-conservative continuum”, has proven to be closely 
related to their attitudes toward diverse policy issues (Sears and Citrin, 1982) and thus should 
influence bureaucratic implementation. Supporting this prediction, Keiser finds indirect 
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effects of SLBs’ ideology on their behaviour: liberal workers were less likely to feel most 
accountable to U.S. taxpayers than conservative workers, and more liberal workers were not 
more likely to make prompt decisions on citizens’ eligibility in the social security disability 
program (2010, 255). Political science research also suggests that bureaucrats may have 
particular policy preferences or leanings toward a certain direction of policy change during 
their career. SLBs are likely to be recruited with a certain level of public service motivation 
and policy preference to make careers in the civil service, and once in office, they may 
develop such policy preference (Gailmard and Patty, 2012). 
  The evidence of the importance of bureaucrats’ ideological or policy preferences in 
implementation abounds in modernised bureaucracies both within and outside the U.S. In the 
U.S., liberal career civil servants during the Reagan administration, one of the most 
conservative executive governments, sometimes acted on their political ideologies and policy 
beliefs (Feldman, 1989; Golden, 2000). In South Korea, the primary case explored in this 
study, there is evidence that state bureaucrats’ policy dispositions play a role in implementing 
elected politicians’ policy change. When Kim Young-sam became the first civilian president 
of the country in 1993 as the candidate of the conservative Democratic Liberal Party, he 
introduced major economic reforms encompassing deregulation and privatisation (Baum, 
2011). However, the marketising economic reform plan was resisted by pro-labour 
bureaucrats who preferred to maintain the status quo. To the bureaucrats who favoured more 
expansive economic policy and an active role for the public sector in shaping the policy, 
Kim’s reform plans were deemed an attempt to limit their latitude. 
 In a word, policy change is implemented mostly by SLBs who have their own 
professional identity (Zacka, 2017), and SLBs may be more resistant to taking actions that are 
inconsistent with their ideology and preferences, dooming such change from politicians to 
failure (Huber and Shipan, 2002, 20; see also Linder and Peters, 1987). Therefore, we expect 
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that any policy change, including a new policy, introduced by elected politicians is more 
likely to be implemented when it is shared by bureaucrats than when there is a discrepancy of 
ideological positions between politicians and bureaucrats.   
Hypothesis 1. Street-level bureaucrats are more likely to implement elected politicians’ 
policy change when the latter’s political ideology is congruent with that of the bureaucrats 
than when they are incongruent.  
 
Perception of Bureaucratic Discretion and Implementation of Policy Change 
The other crucial element affecting SLBs’ policy implementation concerns the perception of 
discretion in the implementation of policy change. The literature on SLBs has long 
emphasised their inherent discretion in policy implementation and its centrality to the 
implementation of policy change (Smith, 1965; Lipsky, 1980/2010; Maynard-Moody and 
Portillo, 2010; Brodkin, 2012). Recent research highlighting behavioural aspects of SLBs’ 
implementation further suggests that the perceived level of bureaucratic discretion is 
connected with bureaucrats’ policy empowerment and success in implementing policy change 
(Ewalt and Jennings, 2004; Van der Voet et al, 2017; Thomann et al, 2018). 
 The inherent nature of discretion becomes important when SLBs choose to exercise it 
(Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993). SLBs often strictly apply the rules for the sake of protecting 
themselves or when their additional effort and risk-taking in stretching or breaking the rules 
on clients’ behalf are deemed unworthy (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003; Maynard-
Moody and Portillo, 2010). SLBs are thus judicious and strategic in their wielding of the 
discretion they have at their command (Maynard-Moody and Portillo, 2010, 267), but 
variation may exist in treatment. Moreover, there are inequities in the extent to which SLBs 
are able to exercise discretion, due to differences in knowledge concerning their tasks 
(Sandfort, 2000; Meyers and Vorsanger, 2003), constraints within implementing 
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organisations (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill, 2000; Hill and Lynn, 2004; Brodkin, 2007, 2011), or 
external circumstances (May and Winter, 2009). 
 For this reason, implementation by SLBs involves inherent discretion, but not all 
workers will perceive the same level of discretion in actual execution. In this regard, recent 
research on how the perception of discretion plays a role in SLBs’ policy implementation 
provides a behavioural insight. When SLBs perceive more discretion in policy 
implementation, the societal or client meaningfulness of a policy is more likely to increase,2 
because policy programs can be aimed at specific situations for the society or the client 
(Tummers and Bekkers, 2014). In turn, SLBs who recognise the meaningfulness of the policy 
may put more effort into implementing the policy, because they are cognisant of their 
influence over the content of the executed policy and their interests can be reflected in the 
content of the new policy (Tummers et al, 2009). In brief, an increase in the perceived level 
of bureaucratic discretion is likely to result in their enhanced willingness to implement policy 
change.   
  We apply this line of reasoning to the relationship between the level of discretion 
perceived by SLBs and their willingness to implement policy change initiated by their elected 
politicians such as governors and mayors. In this case, the meaningfulness of such policy 
change is straightforward to bureaucrats as it is valuable particularly for their elected 
politicians. This so-called “principal meaningfulness” will help bureaucrats to increase their 
willingness to implement policy change in a similar way that client meaningfulness 
stimulates or empowers bureaucrats to execute policy change. Then the motivated 
bureaucrats who are aware of their influence over the content of the new policy are likely to 
make more efforts in implementation. It is not surprising that employees who experience 
 
2 Street-level bureaucrats need to discover the meaningfulness of new policies before they become motivated or 
willing to implement these policies (Tummers et al, 2009). Meaningfulness here concerns bureaucrats’ 
perception that the new policy is valuable for society in general and for their direct clients in particular 
(Thomann et al, 2018). 
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more policy powerfulness are more willing to support policy change or implement a new 
policy (Greenwood et al, 2002; Tummers et al, 2009). In sum, we predict that increased 
levels of discretion-as-perceived will lead to bureaucrats’ greater willingness to execute  
elected politicians’ policy change.  
Hypothesis 2. Street-level bureaucrats are more likely to implement elected politicians’ 
policy change when the bureaucrats perceive more discretion in implementation than when 
they perceive less discretion.  
 
Research Design: A Survey Experiment 
To examine the degree to which SLBs are likely to implement their elected politicians’ policy 
change, we conducted a survey experiment of local civil service officials in South Korea’s 
provincial and municipal governments. We test our hypotheses by employing a list 
experiment, a format of indirect questioning that asks survey respondents to reveal how many 
items on a list are relevant to them. This survey design is particularly useful to address 
potential concerns about social desirability bias and non-random refusals to respond. There 
are several reasons for our choice of this research design.   
 First, given that surveys are conducted at the respondents’ workplace, bureaucrats 
may feel reluctant to disclose their true opinions and assessment of elected politicians’ policy 
change. These settings may generate incentives to conform to prevalent social norms by 
giving answers favouring their governor’s and mayor’s policy change and likely hiding their 
negative opinions about it if asked directly. Moreover, due to the hierarchical structure of 
bureaucratic organisations and the strict civil service culture in South Korea, direct requests 
to evaluate their superiors’ policy may also result in higher non-response rates, which, in 
turn, will lower the validity of our results. Finally, our survey firm negotiated access to career 
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civil servants, and a format of indirect questioning should be preferable for public employees 
as it will attract a higher rate of acceptance among the public agents.  
 The basic design for a list experiment randomises respondents into control and 
treatment groups, where a list of control items is presented to the former group and a list of 
the same control items plus one treatment item (i.e. an item of interest) is shown to the latter 
group. Respondents are then asked to count the number of items on the list that apply to 
them. Through this experimental design, respondents may feel safer in disclosing their 
truthful answers as they are providing these in a more indirect manner. This design also 
enables scholars to estimate the proportion of respondents who are more likely to choose a 
treatment item by varying items on the list across randomly selected control and treatment 
groups (Blair and Imai, 2012).  
 In our study, we asked the following question of our control group: 
When you carry out duties at work, there are many factors affecting your implementation 
decisions. Looking at the list below, how many of the following factors would lead you to 
willingly alter your existing decision for implementation of policy change? Please do not tell 
me which ones you agree with; only say how many factors apply to you. 
1) Learn your local citizens support policy change 
2) Learn your decision is not in alignment with law  
3) Learn your co-workers endorse policy change 
[Items are shown in a randomised order] 
 
 While there are numerous factors potentially inducing local civil servants to exercise 
discretion and change their existing decision for policy change, we choose as the control 
items internal and external settings of bureaucratic organisations that are likely to affect such 
decisions. Among the control items, co-workers’ assessment of policy change and alignment 
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between bureaucrats’ decisions and law concern internal components, whereas local citizens’ 
views of policy change are related to an external element.  
 According to the street-level bureaucracy literature, both bureaucrat-client and 
collegial interactions, as well as bureaucrats’ legal perspective, may affect frontline decisions 
(Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000, 2003; Bovens and Zouridis, 2002; Riccucci, 2005; 
Keiser, 2010; Raaphorst and Loyens, 2020). The interaction between workers and citizens 
has a significant impact on bureaucratic decisions, because the workers are attentive to the 
identities of citizens and make decisions depending on citizens’ characteristics (Maynard-
Moody and Musheno, 2003). Regarding collegial interactions, coworkers’ impact on policy 
implementation is not less significant, due to their possible advisory roles. Recent case 
studies show that bureaucrats may consult colleagues in an attempt to “decrease subjectivism 
of decision making” (Raaphorst and Loyens, 2020, 50).  
 
Treatment Conditions  
In order to estimate which factors cause SLBs to be more likely to implement policy change, 
we split the sample of local civil servants into control and treatment groups. In the previous 
section, we discussed three factors that may affect implementation willingness. With the 
treatment condition, we examine one of the main conditions shaping SLBs’ policy 
implementation decisions: policy change initiated by their incumbent governor/mayor.  
 In our study, we asked our treatment group the same question as the control group, 
with the exception that a treatment item relating to the incumbent governor’s/mayor’s policy 
intention is added to the list:  
When you carry out duties at work, there are many factors affecting your implementation 
decisions. Looking at the list below, how many of the following factors would lead you to 
willingly alter your existing decision for implementation of policy change? Please do not tell 
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me which ones you agree with; only say how many factors apply to you. 
1) Learn your local citizens support policy change 
2) Learn your decision is not in alignment with law  
3) Learn your co-workers endorse policy change 
4) Learn your governor/mayor is initiating policy change 
[Items are shown in a randomised order] 
 
Sampling and Balance 
The survey was conducted in all 243 provincial and municipal governments nested in the 17 
provinces of South Korea between October 2017 and February 2018, with local civil servants 
on the frontline who were recruited by Hankook Research, one of the largest survey research 
firms in South Korea. Survey samples collected by Hankook Research have been broadly 
used in social science research (e.g. Park et al, Forthcoming). The human research subjects 
aspect of our experimental protocol was approved by our university’s Institutional Review 
Board. The sample of bureaucrats was stratified by civil service rank and recruitment type . 
Simple random assignment was used to distribute approximately a half of the sample to the 
control condition and the other half to the treatment condition. Critically for our design, the 
sample covers a broad range of agency settings, each of which is directed by a different 
governor/mayor. In total, our samples include 1,840 local civil servants. Of the completed 
surveys, 918 (49.9%) came from the control group, and 922 (50.1%) from the treatment 
group, making the response rates for the control and treatment conditions similar. 
 We have three independent variables to test our hypotheses. First, governors’ or 
mayors’ policy position is coded 1 if they are from the liberal Democratic Party, and 0 if they 
are from the conservative Saenuri Party. Second, SLBs’ policy position is coded 1 if they 
express their policy position as liberal, and 0 if they express their policy position as 
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conservative. Third, the level of bureaucratic discretion is coded in a five point scale (lowest-
highest) from SLBs’ answers to the question about the level of discretion they perceive in 
policy implementation (Frisch-Aviram, Cohen, and Beeri, 2018).  
 In our models, we also control for the following demographic characteristics and 
occupational backgrounds of both elected local politicians and SLB respondents: 
 An education level of 0 = completion of secondary education (or lower), 1 = college 
graduate (BA), 2 = graduate school (MA), and 3 = graduate school (PhD); 
 A civil service rank of 1 = grade 9 (low), 2 = grade 8, 3 = grade 7, and 4 = grade 6 
(high); 
 A recruitment type of 0 = open recruitment and 1 = centralised civil service exams; 
 A civil service job category of 0 = technical and 1 = administrative 
In Table 1, we report these characteristics by group. The F-test results show that no 
characteristics differ significantly across control and treatment groups at 95% levels of 
statistical significance.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Results  
In this section, we first show the observed data and mean results by group from the list 
experiment to compare the response across our control and treatment groups. Then, to test our 
propositions through more sophisticated multivariate analyses, we present the results using 
maximum likelihood estimators. In Table 2, we first present a summary of the observed data 
for the control and treatment groups. Overall, the distribution of response values is relatively 
normal across the two groups, indicating that flooring or ceiling effects are not likely to be a 
concern. Based on the observed data, the mean response is 1.84 items for the control group 
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and 2.32 items for the treatment group. Examining all respondents, we see a positive and 
statistically significant difference in the mean responses between the treatment and control 
groups. This suggests that SLBs, overall, are likely to implement their governors’ and 
mayors’ policy change through exercising discretion.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
 Based on these mean responses, we look into the estimated proportion of respondents 
who answer our treatment item affirmatively in the list experiment. According to the simple 
estimation based on the difference in the mean response between the treatment and control 
groups, the list experiment indicates that 47.6% (with the 95% confidence interval of [38.9, 
56.2]) of SLB respondents chose their elected politicians’ policy change as influential in 
changing their existing decision on policy implementation. However, our theoretical 
discussion makes more nuanced predictions that: 1) ideological congruence between elected 
local politicians and local civil servants and 2) the level of discretion local bureaucrats 
perceive they possess, can cause them to react differently in terms of their likelihood of 
implementing the politicians’ policy change (see Appendix Table A1 for the results of 
descriptive analysis on ideological congruence). In the next section, therefore, we present our 
multivariate analysis of local civil servants’ implementation willingness by highlighting these 
two factors, in order to examine how they are associated with our treatment condition. 
 
Ideological Congruence, Perception of Discretion, and Implementation of Policy Change 
For our statistical analysis of the list experiment, we use a maximum likelihood estimator 
devised by Blair and Imai (2012). Obtaining statistical efficiency through running a 
multivariate regression analysis is important for the list experiment design, because  
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indirect questioning results in a loss of information (Blair and Imai, 2012). Researchers are 
often interested in 1) knowing how the likelihood of answering the question of interest 
affirmatively changes with respondents’ characteristics while controlling for other variables 
and 2) estimating the population proportion of such respondents. In this case, maximum 
likelihood estimators are useful as the proportion of respondents answering affirmatively to 
the item of interest can be estimated under certain assumptions — 1) there is no design effect 
and 2) no respondents are lying — by computing the difference in the mean response 
between the treatment and control groups (Blair and Imai, 2012, 51-2). 
 In Appendix Table A2, we present the estimated coefficients and their standard errors 
from the fitted binomial logistic regression model where the dependent variable is whether 
or not their elected local politicians’ policy change is considered influential for local civil 
servants to change their existing decision on policy implementation in Model 1. In Model 2, 
the dependent variable is not straightforward due to a two-step procedure required for 
computation. Intuitively, the treatment and control groups are analysed simultaneously, and 
the treatment effects are estimated through the difference in the mean response between the 
treatment and control groups based on the coefficients generated from the fitted binomial 
logistic regression model (i.e. maximum likelihood estimators).  
 Other than the three independent variables (elected politicians’ policy position, 
SLBs’ policy position, and the perceived level of bureaucratic discretion) introduced above, 
we also include as controls the characteristics of both governors/mayors and SLB 
respondents described above, such as demographic characteristics (age, gender, and 
education) and occupational backgrounds (experience in office, rank, recruitment type, and 
job category). Given the quantities of interest, we will present our main empirical findings 
through graphs.  
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Estimating the difference in the mean response between the treatment and control 
groups based on the coefficients presented in Appendix Table A2, we test our first hypothesis 
by comparing the mean response of liberal and conservative SLB respondents under local 
governments ruled by liberal and conservative governors/mayors, respectively, with the list 
experiment. The treatment effect on the two SLB groups and its difference under the two 
governor/mayor groups are graphically described in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows estimated 
proportions of liberal and conservative SLBs answering the “learn your governor/mayor is 
initiating policy change” treatment item affirmatively and the difference in estimated 
proportions of the two groups. The left panel of Figure 1 displays the results under local 
governments headed by liberal governors and mayors, and the right panel of Figure 1 shows 
the results under local governments headed by conservative governors and mayors. In both 
panels, positive estimates of the difference indicate that conservative bureaucrats are more 
willing to implement their elected politicians’ policy change, whereas negative estimates 
indicate that liberal bureaucrats are more willing to implement their elected politicians’ policy 
change.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Examining the results in the two panels, we find a difference in estimated proportions 
that is negative and statistically significant under liberal governors and mayors, but one that 
is positive and statistically significant under conservative governors and mayors. In local 
governments headed by liberal governors and mayors, 45.7% (with the 95% confidence 
interval of [34.1, 57.4]) of conservative and 73.5% (with the 95% confidence interval of 
[66.2, 80.8]) of liberal SLB respondents considered their elected politicians’ policy change 
influential in altering their existing decision on policy implementation. However, in local 
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governments headed by conservative governors and mayors, while 69.8% (with the 95% 
confidence interval of [51.4, 88.1]) of conservative SLB respondents considered their elected 
politicians’ policy change important, about 48% (with the 95% confidence interval of [37.2, 
58]) of liberal SLB respondents chose their elected politicians’ policy change as influential in 
altering their existing decision on policy execution.  
This finding strongly supports our first hypothesis (H1), suggesting that whether 
elected politicians’ policy position is compatible with that of SLBs in local governments has 
a powerful impact on SLBs’ likelihood of implementing these politicians’ new policies. This 
finding is in line with previous research showing that SLBs’ political ideology plays a role in 
interpreting and executing elected politicians’ programs (Keiser, 1999, 2010). It is also 
aligned with the literature demonstrating limited political influence on SLBs’ 
implementation; the finding also indicates that SLBs’ own policy dispositions become more 
important in deciding whether politicians’ policy change is performed as intended or not 
(Brehm and Gates, 1997; Riccucci et al, 2004; Riccucci, 2005). 
Further to this hypothesis, we also predicted that the degree of discretion SLBs 
perceive would affect their implementation of policy change in local governments. We thus 
test our second hypothesis by estimating the difference in the mean response between the 
treatment and control groups based on the coefficients presented in Appendix Table A2 and 
comparing such difference across varying perceived levels of discretion with the list 
experiment. Presented in Figure 2 are the treatment effects varying across the degree of 
discretion perceived by local civil servants. Figure 2 shows estimated proportions of SLBs 
answering the “learn your governor/mayor is initiating policy change” treatment item 
affirmatively, ranging from the highest 25 percent to the lowest 25 percent of our sample in 
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The results in Figure 2 show a positive relationship between the levels of discretion 
SLBs perceive they have in local governments and their likelihood of implementing their 
elected politicians’ policy change. For an increase in the perceived level of bureaucratic 
discretion from among the lowest 25 percent to among the highest 25 percent of our sample, 
the estimated proportion of SLB respondents choosing their elected politicians’ policy change 
as influential in altering their existing decision increases by 11 percentage points, holding all 
other variables constant. This finding suggests that the more discretion bureaucrats perceive 
to exist in implementation, the more likely they are to exercise discretion to implement their 
elected politicians’ policy change. Overall, the results are in line with our second hypothesis 
(H2). Confirming findings from existing research (Tummers and Bekkers, 2014; Thomann et 
al, 2018), the perceived level of discretion indeed plays an important role in SLBs’ policy 
implementation, because their policy powerfulness, increasing with their perception of 
discretion, shapes their interests in supporting and implementing any policy change 
(Tummers et al, 2009). 
In sum, the results of our analysis suggest that, despite the central government’s 
influence over local governments in South Korea, there is ample room for exercising 
discretion in SLBs’ policy implementation at the local level; and whether to implement 
elected local politicians’ policy change is determined by street-level factors, such as SLBs’ 
ideological position and their perception of discretion in implementation. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we seek to broaden our understanding of how SLBs respond to elected 
politicians’ policy change. Specifically, we focus on the impact of two street-level factors on 
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SLBs’ behaviour: the congruence of policy position in politician-bureaucrat relationships and 
the degree of discretion SLBs perceive in implementation. Regarding SLBs’ behaviour, we 
examine the extent to which SLBs are likely to alter their existing decision concerning 
implementation of elected politicians’policy change. For this analysis, we developed an 
original survey design using an indirect list experiment and employed statistical methods to 
estimate coefficients of interest from the survey experiment. We find that street-level factors 
indeed affect SLBs’ implementation decisions. Local civil servants are more likely to 
implement their governors’ and mayors’ policy change when the elected politicians’ policy 
position is more congruent with that of their own than when it is incongruent. Moreover, the 
treatment effects – the degree to which SLBs intend to implement the elected politicians’ 
policy change – are greater when SLBs perceive higher levels of discretion within local 
agencies.  
 Although we endeavoured to make our experimental design as robust as possible, 
there are some alternative explanations for our findings on bureaucrats’ implementation 
intentions. In terms of bureaucratic discretion, we mainly conceptualise it by focusing on the 
level of discretion SLBs perceive in policy implementation, but variation in exercising 
discretionary power may be conditional on other factors, such as their personality or their 
relationship with superiors and middle managers (Prottas, 1979; Brehm and Hamilton, 1996; 
Riccucci et al, 2004; Tummers and Bekkers, 2014; Chen et al, 2017). If SLBs are able to 
build closer relationships with their elected politicians or they have a personality that leads 
them to be more open to a change, then it will positively affect bureaucrats’ willingness to 
implement the politicians’ policy change. In addition, while the South Korean case provides 
useful insights into how SLBs’ policy position plays a role in implementing elected 
politicians’ policy change, confirming the importance of rank-and-file bureaucrats’ 
preferences in exercising discretion in policy implementation (Brehm and Gates, 1997; 
21 
 
Riccucci, 2005), the hierarchical nature of intergovernmental relations might limit the 
generalisation of our findings to federal government systems, such as the U.S.  
 Our study makes clear contributions to the literature on behavioural public policy and 
administration and provides, through experimental evidence, a behavioural insight into 
conditions where SLBs are more likely to exercise discretion in implementing policy change. 
Our analysis also speaks to the debate between top-down versus bottom-up approaches to 
bureaucratic discretion. Our findings give support to the latter perspective and suggest that 
street-level factors are important in understanding their implementation decisions, including 
their likelihood of executing policy change. Yet, future research should seek to explore 
further other political and administrative conditions beyond policy implementation settings, 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of Respondents by Group 
  Control Treatment F-Test 
Governor/Mayor Characteristics 
Policy position  0.40 0.39 0.02 (0.902) 
Female (%) 3.27 3.25 0.00 (0.986) 
Age (years) 61.85 61.60 0.69 (0.405) 
Education 1.86 1.88 0.22 (0.637) 
Experience in office (years) 5.5 5.4 0.89 (0.346) 
SLB Characteristics 
Policy position 0.40 0.41 0.40 (0.525) 
Bureaucratic discretion  3.06 3.04 0.23 (0.630) 
Female (%) 38.02 38.61 0.07 (0.793) 
Age (years) 42.24 42.22 0.00 (0.971) 
Education 1.02 1.03 0.79 (0.373) 
Rank 2.14 2.14 0.00 (0.959) 
Centralised recruitment 0.92 0.91 0.10 (0.756) 
Private sector exp. (years) 1.19 1.32 1.31 (0.252) 
Job category 0.73 0.72 0.27 (0.604) 
N 918 922  
Note: The table presents the mean value of each variable by group and F-test statstics with p-








Table 2. Observed Data from the List Experiment  
 
 Control  Treatment  
Response value Frequency Proportion Frequency Proportion 
0 37 4.03% 33 3.58% 
1 294 32.03% 143 15.51% 
2 364 39.65% 406 44.03% 
3 223 24.29% 178 19.31% 
4   162 17.57% 
Total 918  922  
Note: The table displays the number of respondents for each response value and its proportion 










































Note: Estimated proportions are based on the regression models in Appendix Table A2.  
 
 
 
 
